This short essay presents a critical cartography of the critical new materialist notion and methodology of diffraction.

This article reviews the debate on ‘intersectionality’ as the dominant approach in gender studies, with an emphasis on the politics of representation. The debate on intersectionality officially began in the late 1980s, though the approach can be traced back to the institutionalization of women's studies in the 1970s and the feminist movement of the 1960s. Black and lesbian feminists have long advocated hyphenated identities to be the backbone of feminist thought. But in recent years, intersectionality has sustained criticism from numerous (...) angles within gender studies, ranging from feminist philosophy to applied political research. This article will use the theorization of ‘interference’ as a searchlight to produce an overview of this interdisciplinary debate, culminating in our affirmative answer to the question: should we move from intersectionality to interference? Our answer is based on onto-epistemological reflections, i.e., reflections in which being and knowing are always already entangled. -/- . (shrink)

Quantum leaps happen in texts, too. This reading of the role of the quantum leap in Karen Barad's agential realism is necessary, because arguing that the diffractive reading strategy proposed by Barad's ethico-onto-epistemology mirrors the physical phenomenon of diffraction would indeed be representationalist. Reviewing how Barad—in her own oeuvre—has transformed diffraction into an innovative reading methodology that could not only potentially challenge the epistemological underpinnings of the canonization process that is at work in feminist theory, but could also radically change (...) the canonization practice of feminist oeuvres itself, our article embarks on a detailed examination of the ways in which the oeuvres of Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray have been mistakenly categorized and canonized in a hierarchical and Oedipalized manner. This conflict-based narrative has not only paralyzed the oeuvres of Irigaray and Beauvoir, but also has had a negative impact on the canonization of sexual difference philosophy as a whole in feminist theory. By (re)reading the oeuvres diffractively, this article brings the feminist philosophies of Beauvoir and Irigaray together by invalidating the idea that the feminist canonization process always has to run along the lines of discontinuity, Oedipalization and dialectization. (shrink)

Epistemic terms of various syntactic categories can uniformly be used to do the same thing: to hedge. This essay clarifies hedging as a phenomenon and explains how hedging happens by advancing the positional theory. The guiding idea is that, in uttering declaratives, speakers signal what their epistemic position is towards the content put into play by the declarative. The default signal is that the speaker knows. But when an epistemic term hedges, the term overrides the default. The non-default signal sent (...) is that the speaker or someone else occupies the position indicated by the term. To make that idea precise, the positional theory treats hedging as a discourse function. Terms hedge because of how a declarative containing an epistemic term is situated within a discourse. (shrink)

The development of cultured meat has gained urgency through the increasing problems associated with meat, but what it might become is still open in many respects. In existing debates, two main moral profiles can be distinguished. Vegetarians and vegans who embrace cultured meat emphasize how it could contribute to the diminishment of animal suffering and exploitation, while in a more mainstream profile cultured meat helps to keep meat eating sustainable and affordable. In this paper we argue that these profiles do (...) not exhaust the options and that feelings as well as imagination are needed to explore possible future options. On the basis of workshops, we present a third moral profile, “the pig in the backyard”. Here cultured meat is imagined as an element of a hybrid community of humans and animals that would allow for both the consumption of animal protein and meaningful relations with domestic animals. Experience in the workshops and elsewhere also illustrates that thinking about cultured meat inspires new thoughts on “normal” meat. In short, the idea of cultured meat opens up new search space in various ways. We suggest that ethics can take an active part in these searches, by fostering a process that integrates feelings, imagination and rational thought and that expands the range of our moral identities. (shrink)

Geheel in lijn met de rest van Europa-denk bijvoorbeeld aan de toegenomen populariteit van de radicaal-rechtse Zweden-Democraten (Sverigedemokraterna) en de verkiezing van de eerste naoorlogse radicaal-rechtse premier van Italië, Giorgia Meloni-maakt postpandemisch België een politieke draai naar (radicaal) rechts. Deze wending is vooral merkbaar in Vlaanderen: Uit een krantenpeiling van december 2022 blijkt dat 25,5 procent van de Vlamingen bij de volgende verkiezingen van plan is om op het Vlaams Belang te stemmen, die op de voet gevolgd worden door de (...) N-VA met zo'n 22 procent van de stemmen. Bijna de helft van de Vlaamse kiezers heeft dus een voorkeur voor een Vlaams-nationalistische regering, wat de federale coalitiebesprekingen en de politieke toekomst van België in 2024 wel eens negatief zou kunnen beïnvloeden. N-VA-voorzitter Bart De Wever verklaarde onlangs bovendien te willen samenwerken met het Vlaams Belang, op voorwaarde dat de partij zich zou ontdoen van haar meest radicale vertegenwoordigers. Dit alles betekent dat het zogenoemde cordon sanitaire-akkoord uit 1989-bedoeld om antidemocratische partijen uit politieke coalitiebesprekingen te weren-binnenkort wel eens zou kunnen sneuvelen. (shrink)

This longread addresses the (political and critical theoretical) aftermath of 9/11.

Causal determinism is the view that all events in the universe are predetermined and that the laws of nature causally necessitate these events. In the debates on free will, there are two different positions called incompatibilism and compatibilism. Accordingly, compatibilist accounts claim that free will and causal determinism can be compatible and coexist. On the contrary, incompatibilist accounts defend that compatibilist accounts are problematic and claim that free will cannot exist in a universe where causal determinism holds. The main approach (...) that we will consider in this work will be the incompatibilist approach of the American philosopher Peter van Inwagen, which he defends in free will debates. The arguments put forward by Peter van Inwagen as the basis of incompatibilism can be summarized as the consequence argument and the Mind argument. The consequence argument, hypothetically takes into account a world in which causally deterministic and claiming that free will doesn't exist in such a world. Peter van Inwagen's Mind argument, on the other hand, claims that agent-causation cannot be sufficient for a definite possession of free will because a person who represents oneself as an agent in every event s/he is involved in, cannot be sure whether the consequences of these events are due to chance. In both arguments, Peter van Inwagen refers to philosophical moves that affirm incompatibilism is consistent for free will debate. Therefore in my dissertation, I argue that incompatibilism is actually a sufficient step towards solving the free will and causal determinism dilemma in a theoretical sense. This work also deals with Peter van Inwagen's views on philosophy of action and philosophy of religion in general. Additionally, in order to draw the relational framework between causal determinism and free will, the concepts of 'event', 'causal powers' and 'states of affairs' are used methodologically. Instead of just having an ethical discussion of free will, I took care to stay within the boundaries of the metaphysics of free will. (shrink)

Finishing this essay exactly one year after the official arrival of the SARS-COV-2 virus in Belgium and the Netherlands—where the cartographers of this essay are currently located—it is safe to say that the COVID-19 pandemic has immensely impacted our day-to-day lives. The pandemic has not only forced us to question various taken-for-granted existential certainties and luxuries provided by a capitalist system out to destroy the earth but has also re-spotlighted post-Enlightenment critiques of the human subject. If these pandemic times are (...) indeed more-than-human, then the clock is ticking for the discipline of philosophical anthropology to face these post-anthropological facts and receive what feminist science studies scholar Donna J. Haraway has aptly called a thorough dose of “epistemological electroshock therapy” (1988, p. 578). Taking Haraway’s foregoing call and the idea of thinking-with the (end of the) Anthropocene seriously, we construct a critical cartography of Emmanuel Levinas’ take on philosophical anthropology in dialogue with other major philosophical anthropologists and feminist new materialists while arguing for a post-anthropology for the Chthulucene. (shrink)

The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit (Berlin/New York 2007) which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde’s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus (...) Willaschek’s Moorean compatibilism, I argue that our ordinary notion of agency commits us to genuine two-way abilities, i. e. to abilities to do otherwise given the same past and laws of nature. Against Christoph Jäger’s defence of van Inwagen’s consequence argument, I insist that this argument for incompati-bilism is seriously flawed and that libertarians are well-advised not to base their position upon it. (shrink)

Sinds de opmars van het Foucaultiaanse poststructuralisme – vaak opgepikt door feministische denkers die Michel Foucaults (1976) (le) pouvoir-savoir of de verstrengeling van macht en kennis wel konden appreciëren – zijn er verschillende post-poststructuralistische filosofieën bijgekomen die inzoomen op wereldlijke entiteiten en hun verhoudingen. Naast deze door Foucault opnieuw belichte verhoudingen, en de epistemologische manieren waarop wij kennis kunnen verkrijgen over de subjecten en objecten die achter deze door macht gekenmerkte relaties schuilgaan, bekritiseren deze stromingen ook een ander, door Foucault (...) aangestipt, Verlichtingsthema: het moderne antropocentrische wereld- en mensbeeld. (shrink)

This article addresses the Conings case – a Belgian soldier, currently wanted for threatening Belgium’s top virologist Marc Van Ranst and the illegal possession of weapons in a terrorist context. It moreover argues for a more situated analysis of Belgium’s far-right extremism by looking at its complex political climate.

Ongeveer vijf weken na de start van de jacht op Jürgen Conings, de Belgische beroepsmilitair gezocht omwille van het bedreigen van viroloog Marc Van Ranst en andere prominente doelwitten, vond men zijn stoffelijk overschot terug in het Dilserbos, Dilsen-Stokkem. Ook na zijn dood – Conings overleed hoogstwaarschijnlijk door zelfmoord – blijft de zaak Conings het Belgische sociaal-politieke landschap beroeren en de publieke opinie verdelen: de mate van steun die Conings de afgelopen weken kreeg, toont nog maar eens aan dat extreemrechts (...) een serieus maatschappelijk probleem is in België, waarvan de reikwijdte bovendien maar al te vaak miskend wordt. (shrink)

Emancipatie en integratie, nationalisme, machtsonderdrukking en privileges, (super)diversiteit en erkenning. Het zijn slechts een paar van de beladen termen waar we tegenwoordig veel mee geconfronteerd worden, en dat in de context van persoonlijke identiteitsvorming als in debatten omtrent groepsidentiteit, de vraag naar minderheidsrechten en de gepercipieerde conflicten met de zogenaamde democratische Westerse Verlichtingsidealen die daar vervolgens uit voortkomen. Heel veel van deze politieke discussies die momenteel gevoerd worden binnen de politiek en de media draaien om ‘identiteit’, waardoor dit concept helaas (...) tot een gepolitiseerd en polariserend begrip verworden is. (shrink)

1. Introduction: a look back at the reasons vs. causes debate. 2. The interventionist account of causation. 3. Four objections to interventionism. 4. The counterfactual analysis of event causation. 5. The role of free agency. 6. Causality in the human sciences. -- The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are causal or not. Melden, (...) Peters, Winch, Kenny and Anscombe had contributed their anticausal conceptions. The neo-Wittgensteinians seemed to be winning the day when in 1963 Donald Davidson published his seminal paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Davidson’s paper devastated the Wittgensteinian camp. It contained, among other things, a powerful attack on the logical connection argument. Davidson argued that the existence of a logical or conceptual connection between descriptions can never eliminate a causal relation, which holds between events simpliciter, not between events under certain descriptions. Davidson maintained that in a way, reasons can be causes. When somebody acts for a certain reason, his intentional attitudes, or rather changes in his attitudes, cause his bodily movements. Davidson also argued that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. For the definition of action, he argued that intentional actions are bodily movements caused in the right way by beliefs and desires that rationalize them. Davidson’s paper paved the way for causal theories of action, which superseded neo-Wittgensteinian analyses in the following decades. The causal theory was rapidly adopted by Alvin Goldman, David Armstrong, Paul Churchland, Myles Brand and many others, entering the mainstream and dominating the philosophy of action to this very day. In 1971 Georg Henrik von Wright published his book "Explanation and Understanding". The second chapter did not deal with agency, but with causation. It developed a new account of causation, the interventionist or experimentalist account. Focusing on causation, von Wright remedied a major shortcoming of the reasons vs. causes debate. The concept of causality, and the nature of the causal relation, received little attention in this debate, a fact that holds true for both camps. Mostly it was simply taken for granted that, as Hempel had declared, “causal explanation is a special type of deductive-nomological explanation”. One camp then aligned intentional explanations with D-N explanations, while the other camp insisted on their disparity. So strictly speaking, the label “reasons/causes debate” was a misnomer. The controversy dealt primarily with the question as to whether intentional explanations can take the form of D-N explanations, while the notion of causation, and the metaphysics of the causal relation, were left obscured. With von Wright’s new approach, the situation changed. Von Wright was primarily concerned with causation, but his approach contained an implicit attack on the causal theory of action as well. His core idea was that the notion of causality is intimately linked with, or even derived from, the notion of intentionally making something happen. Other philosophers, even Hume, had considered such a connection before, but often just to reject this view, regarding it as a kind of myth belonging to the infancy of the human mind. Von Wright took the idea seriously. He submitted the analysis that p is the cause of q if and only if by doing p we could bring about q. The causal theory of action was also concerned with the relation between causation and agency, to which its name bears witness. The causal theory of action holds that actions are bodily movements with a certain causal history. This is why von Wright’s account constituted a momentous challenge to the causal theory: it reversed the direction of conceptual dependency between both notions. Davidson and his followers tried to define what an intentional action is by using the notion of causation. The causal condition which the causal theory sets is part of the definition of “doing something intentionally”. Von Wright claimed that the conceptual dependency is the other way round. He used the notions of doing, and bringing about, to explain what causal relations are. So, instead of a causal theory of action, he advocated an agency theory of causation, as it may be dubbed. It is remarkable how seldom this clash of opinions about conceptual primacy is reflected in the literature. There are few exceptions: Fred Stoutland noticed the conflict, and he published a number of papers in which he compared Davidson’s and von Wright’s views. Von Wright’s book "Explanation and Understanding" was widely read and discussed in the seventies, especially in Europe. But it strikes me that especially in North America, where the causal theory of action became the orthodoxy of the day, von Wright’s challenge went largely unnoticed. Even Davidson did not seem to take it seriously. He nowhere takes notice of the interventionist theory of causation, while he does discuss von Wright’s earlier book "Norm and Action". As is well-known, Davidson favoured an alternative account of causation, based on “the principle of the nomological character of causality”, as he somewhat clumsily called it, or, later and less clumsily, “the cause-law thesis”. Davidson’s firm adherence to a nomological theory of causality may explain why he did not take much interest in alternative accounts. [...] -/- . 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I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a (...) way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii) have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for the product of self-deception. (shrink)

This essay argues that there are theoretical benefits to keeping distinct—more pervasively than the literature has done so far—the psychological states of imagining that p versus believing that in-the-story p, when it comes to cognition of fiction and other forms of narrative. Positing both in the minds of a story’s audience helps explain the full range of reactions characteristic of story consumption. This distinction also has interesting conceptual and explanatory dimensions that haven’t been carefully observed, and the two mental state (...) types make distinct contributions to generating emotional responses to stories. Finally, the differences between the mental states illuminate how a given story can be both shared with others and at the same time experienced as personal. (shrink)

*Nhân dịp đầu năm mới, phóng viên Chẫu Quê cậy thân quen, phỏng vấn ông Bói Cá đang ngủ gật trên cành tre giữa ao. Ông Bói Cá bị quấy rầy giấc ngủ gắt gỏng bảo: 3 câu thôi nhé. Thì 3 câu. (Gớm nữa, ai hỏi hơn đâu mà đã giao hẹn sớm thế!).

An overview of 20 years of environmental philosophy in the Netherlands.

David Enoch recently defended the idea that there are valid inferences of the form ‘it would be good if p, therefore, p’. I argue that Enoch's proposal allows us to infer the absurd conclusion that ours is the best of all possible worlds.

De Cruz and Levy, in their commentaries on Religion as Make-Believe, present distinct questions that can be addressed by clarifying one core idea. De Cruz asks whether one can rationally assess the mental state of religious credence that I theorize. Levy asks why we should not explain the data on religious “belief” merely by positing factual beliefs with religious contents, which happen to be rationally acquired through testimony. To both, I say that having religious credences is p-irrational: a purposeful departure (...) from rational thought and behavior, where the purpose in question is maintaining a group identity. (shrink)

Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas holds that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. In so doing, he takes himself to be rejecting a Platonic version of substance dualism; his criticisms, however, apply equally to a traditional understanding of Cartesian dualism. Aquinas’s own peculiar brand of dualism is receiving increased attention from contemporary philosophers—especially those attracted to positions that fall between Cartesian substance dualism and reductive materialism. What Aquinas’s own view amounts to, however, is subject to debate. (...) Philosophers (such as J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae) have claimed that ‘Thomistic substance dualism’ (TSD) centers around two beliefs: (1) the rational soul is an immaterial substance, and (2) this immaterial substance is the human person. In this paper, I argue that labeling such an account ‘Thomistic’ proves dangerously misleading—not only does Aquinas himself explicitly deny both of these claims, but he denies them for philosophically significant reasons. Furthermore, I argue that Aquinas’s own position provides an account of human nature both more coherent and philosophically attractive. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that all extant theories of prudential value are either a) enumeratively deficient, in that they are unable to accommodate everything that, intuitively, is a basic constituent of prudential value, b) explanatorily deficient, in that they are at least sometimes unable to offer a plausible story about what makes a given thing prudentially valuable, or c) both. In response to the unsatisfactory state of the literature, I present my own account, the Disjunctive Hybrid Theory or DHT. (...) DHT answers to and remedies each of the above inadequacies in a way that no other approach can. This account has the following general structure:Disjunctive Hybrid Theory (DHT): Thing x is basically good for person P if and only if x is either a) cared about (sufficiently and in the right way) by P, b) a bearer of (the right kind of) attitude-independent value, or c) both.Although it follows other recent accounts in combining elements from objective and subjective theories, DHT is a hybrid theory of a quite new kind. This is because it denies both subjective necessity (the constraint that, if thing x is to be basically good for person P, P must have some pro-attitude toward x) and objective necessity (the constraint that, if thing x is to be basically good for person P, x must have some attitude-independent value). I argue that the rejection of both necessity claims is called for if we are to move beyond the enumerative and explanatory limitations of existing accounts.I begin by outlining the general structure of DHT. I then argue, against various recent authors, that desire-satisfactionism remains the most appealing subjectivist approach to prudential value, in that it is best able to capture the central subjectivist insight. This insight is that a person can confer prudential value upon things by caring about them (sufficiently and in the right way). The subjectivist strand of DHT will thus be a version of desire-satisfactionism, which must be interpreted in line with what I call the object, as opposed to the combo, view. I move on to further motivate and develop the second, objectivist strand of DHT. This part of the theory involves a commitment to robustly attitude-independent prudential goods. I close by addressing some puzzles for the theory, and considering some of its more specific applications. (shrink)

Đến khúc này, 3 ông bói cá cũng bí nên chuyển chủ đề. Hướng sang vấn đề ăn cá vậy. Đây là vấn đề truyền thống lâu đời. Có chuyện gì lớn?

Hàng năm, việc công bố danh sách các nhà nghiên cứu thuộc tốp 100 ngàn các nhà nghiên cứu có trích dẫn khoa học hàng đầu thế giới theo Cơ sở dữ liệu Scopus là vấn đề rất được cộng đồng khoa học quan tâm. -/- Năm 2021, kết quả này đã tiếp tục được công bố bởi nhóm tác giả gồm TS. John P. A. Ioannidis (giáo sư thực thụ về y khoa, nghiên cứu sức khỏe và chính sách, (...) khoa học dữ liệu y sinh và thống kê học thuộc Đại học Stanford, Mỹ), Jeroen Baas (giám đốc dữ liệu của Nhà xuất bản Elsevier, Hà Lan) và TS. Kevin Boyack (giám đốc điều hành của Công ty SciTech Strategies, Mỹ; chuyên về trắc lượng khoa học). -/- Việc sử dụng Cơ sở dữ liệu Scopus thuộc Nhà xuất bản Elsevier của Hà Lan làm cho kết quả của nhóm tác giả trở nên tin cậy và có ảnh hưởng sâu rộng trong cộng đồng khoa học thế giới bởi lẽ Scopus là một trong hai cơ sở dữ liệu khoa học uy tín nhất trên thế giới hiện nay, bên cạnh Cơ sở dữ liệu Web of Science của Mỹ. -/- Trong năm nay, nhóm tác giả trên công bố các danh sách các nhà nghiên cứu có trích dẫn khoa học cao thuộc tốp 100.000 hoặc tốp 2% trên toàn thế giới gồm xét theo thành tựu trọn đời, thành tựu năm gần nhất và thành tựu theo chuyên ngành. (shrink)

A first-order theory T has the Independence Property provided deduction of a statement of type (quantifiers) (P -> (P1 or P2 or .. or Pn)) in T implies that (quantifiers) (P -> Pi) can be deduced in T for some i, 1 <= i <= n). Variants of this property have been noticed for some time in logic programming and in linear programming. We show that a first-order theory has the Independence Property for the class of basic formulas provided it (...) can be axiomatized with Horn sentences. The existence of free models is a useful intermediate result. The independence Property is also a tool to decide that a sentence cannot be deduced. We illustrate this with the case of the classical Caratheodory theorem for Pasch-Peano geometries. (shrink)

Aim: To elicit preferences for prognostic information, attitudes towards withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (WLST) and perspectives on acceptable quality of life after post-anoxic coma within the adult general population of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States of America. Methods: A web-based survey, consisting of questions on respondent characteristics, perspectives on quality of life, communication of prognostic information, and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, was taken by adult respondents recruited from four countries. Statistical analysis included descriptive analysis and chi2-tests for (...) dierences between countries. Results: In total, 2012 respondents completed the survey. In each country, at least 84% indicated they would prefer to receive early prognostic information. If a poor outcome was predicted with some uncertainty, 37-54% of the respondents indicated that WLST was not to be allowed. A conscious state with severe physical and cognitive impairments was perceived as acceptable quality of life by 17–44% of the respondents. Clear differences between countries exist, including respondents from the U.S. being more likely to allow WLST than respondents from Germany (OR = 1.99, p < 0.001) or the Netherlands (OR = 1.74, p < 0.001) and preferring to stay alive in a conscious state with severe physical and cognitive impairments more than respondents from Italy (OR = 3.76, p < 0.001), Germany (OR = 2.21, p < 0.001), or the Netherlands (OR = 2.39, p < 0.001). Conclusions: Over one-third of the respondents considered WLST unacceptable when there is any remaining prognostic uncertainty. Respondents had a more positive perspective on acceptable quality of life after coma than what is currently considered acceptable in medical literature. This indicates a need for a closer look at the practice of WLST based on prognostic information, to ensure responsible use of novel prognostic tests. (shrink)

We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (All P are Q, Some P are Q, Some P are not Q, and No P are Q). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. It is shown that, although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expression (in the form of the Gergonne circles) which constitute a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. (...) It is hypothesized that the quantified sentences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of diagrams (models). Nine predictions are derived (three semantic, two pragmatic, and four mixed) regarding people's assessment of how well each of the five diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. The results from three experiments, using Gergonne's circles or an adaptation of Leibniz lines as external representations, are reported and shown to support the predictions. (shrink)

One popular theodicy says that good can’t exist without evil, and so God must allow evil in order to allow good. Call this the counterpart theodicy. The counterpart theodicy relies on a metaphysical claim about existence—good cannot exist without evil. A second popular theodicy says that we would be unable to know/recognize/appreciate the good without evil, and so God is forced to allow evil in order to allow for such appreciation. Call this the appreciation theodicy. The appreciation theodicy relies on (...) an epistemological claim about recognition or appreciation—we are unable to know/recognize/appreciate good without evil (even if it is possible for good to exist without evil). Determining whether either of these theodicies is a success requires a careful discussion of whether either meets the conditions on a successful theodicy. I argue that both fail. (shrink)

This study aimed to analyze the role of job satisfaction and transformation leadership for employees’ commitment to organizational change. Based on a survey sample of 381 employees in post-merger enterprises in retail and pharmaceutical sector and a linear regression model. The results revealed that Transformational leadership was associated positively and significantly with Affective Commitment (β = .42, p < .000), Normative Commitment (β = .32, p < .000), and Continuance Commitment (β = .27, p < .000); Job satisfaction was associated (...) positively and significantly with Affective Commitment (β = .24, p < .000) and Normative Commitment (β = .30, p < .000) among employees’ to organizational change. The results of this study provide a foundation of theory and practice for organizational changes that can efficiently exploit the human resource for the development in the next period. (shrink)

Kết quả nghiên cứu đăc biệt có giá trị khoa học và thực tiễn khi kết quả cho thấy mạng lưới các nhà khoa học xã hội tại Việt Nam vẫn còn yếu và chưa bền vững.

Do xu hướng biến thiên mật độ methane trong bầu khí quyển vẫn còn thiếu hụt, do đó bài nghiên cứu của Skeie, Hodnebrog & Myhre (2023) trên tạp chí Communications Earth & Environment sẽ giúp ta hiểu thêm một số điểm quan trọng.

Review of Van Parijs and Vanderborght's book, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy. Van Parijs refers to this book as not only a "toolkit for the people advocating Basic Income around the world, but also for people criticizing it." This book is a must-read for anyone interested in Basic Income.

The educational setting has changed when pandemic forced everyone to take a reset. The change also known as transition from one modality to another paves the way to surface different stressors and tensions among the teachers and learners. In the literature, little attention was given to the teachers who experienced transition from the change of modality as more research studies focused on the learners’ academic performance. This study used a Heideggerian Phenomenology research design in explicating the lived experiences of the (...) teachers exposed in the transition from modular instruction to face-to-face classes. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) popularized by Moustakas and modified by Van Kaam was used in analyzing the authentic experiences of the participants. There were 8 participants in this study when the data saturation was reached. Semi-structured questionnaire was utilized in conducting the interview. There are four emerging themes generated – The Defect, The Struggles, Pedagogical Challenges, and the Inevitable Stressors. These themes are clear manifestations of how teachers are surviving and thriving in these trying times. It is expedient to create management plans that can alleviate the teachers’ circumstances which can make them ready in transitioning to any mode of teaching.The educational setting has changed when pandemic forced everyone to take a reset. The change also known as transition from one modality to another paves the way to surface different stressors and tensions among the teachers and learners. In the literature, little attention was given to the teachers who experienced transition from the change of modality as more research studies focused on the learners’ academic performance. This study used a Heideggerian Phenomenology research design in explicating the lived experiences of the teachers exposed in the transition from modular instruction to face-to-face classes. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) popularized by Moustakas and modified by Van Kaam was used in analyzing the authentic experiences of the participants. There were 8 participants in this study when the data saturation was reached. Semi-structured questionnaire was utilized in conducting the interview. There are four emerging themes generated – The Defect, The Struggles, Pedagogical Challenges, and the Inevitable Stressors. These themes are clear manifestations of how teachers are surviving and thriving in these trying times. It is expedient to create management plans that can alleviate the teachers’ circumstances which can make them ready in transitioning to any mode of teaching. (shrink)

De moderne filosofie lijdt aan muziekvergetelheid. Opvallend is echter dat filosofen, wanneer ze toch aandacht schenken aan muziek, hun aandacht bij voorkeur op één bepaald genre richten, namelijk de opera. Filosofen zoals Søren Kierkegaard en Friedrich Nietzsche lieten hun gedachten over Don Giovanni, Parsifal en Carmen gaan, terwijl omgekeerd de filosofie van Arthur Schopenhauer de opera heeft beïnvloed via Wagner. Diens werk lijkt zich op het snijpunt van het grensverkeer tussen moderne filosofie en moderne muziek te bevinden. Het was zijn (...) ambitie de menselijke existentie en de menselijke geschiedenis in één panoramisch oeuvre te vatten, vanaf het primordiale begin tot en met de dramatische finale die ophanden leek: een catastrofale apotheose die een geheel nieuwe toekomst mogelijk zou maken. Dat is althans de verhaallijn van zijn meesterwerk Der Ring des Nibelungen. Aan het slot van Götterdämmerung lijkt zich een algehele verwoesting te hebben voltrokken: ‘Everything is destroyed and there is an enigmatic kind of hovering over the scene of destruction’ (Badiou 2010, p. 106), een ambivalente stemming van hoop en destructie zette Wagner op muziek. Voor Wagner is dan ook een hoofdrol in deze studie weggelegd: voor zijn muziektheoretische geschriften (waarin hij over een ‘muziek van de toekomst’ filosofeerde), maar meer nog voor de muzikale totaalkunstwerken die hij daadwerkelijk componeerde. (shrink)

A brief introductory note to the special issue of the Journal of Philosophy on "Parts and Wholes", setting the background for the seven papers included in the rest of the issue (by K. Fine, H. Hudson, M. Johnston, K. Koslicki, C. Normore, P. M. Simons, and P. van Inwagen).

Bu yazıda bir sanat yapıtının sahte olmasının ne anlama geldiği incelenmektedir. Bu amaçla iki tür sahtecilik türü olan yapıt kopyacılığı ve biçem kopyacılığı birbirinden ayırt edilmektedir. İlk tür kopyacılık ile ilgili temel tartışma bir yapıtın aslından ayırt edilemeyecek kadar iyi bir kopyası neden yine de sanatsal olarak aslından daha değersiz bulunur, sorusuyla ilgilidir. İkinci tür kopyacılıkta ise temel soru bir sanatçının biçemini taklit ederek "yeni" yapıtlar üretmenin sanatsal açıdan nasıl değerlendirilmesi gerektiğidir. Yazıda bu ikinci tür kopyacılık, Hollandalı ressam Van Meegeren'in (...) Vermeer'in biçemini taklit ederek yapıp Naziler'e sattığı tablolar üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. (shrink)

Van Fraassen's Judy Benjamin problem asks how one ought to update one's credence in A upon receiving evidence of the sort ``A may or may not obtain, but B is k times likelier than C'', where {A,B,C} is a partition. Van Fraassen's solution, in the limiting case of increasing k, recommends a posterior converging to the probability of A conditional on A union B, where P is one's prior probability function. Grove and Halpern, and more recently Douven and Romeijn, have (...) argued that one ought to leave credence in A unchanged, i.e. fixed at P(A). We argue that while the former approach is superior, it brings about a Reflection violation due in part to neglect of a ``regression to the mean'' phenomenon, whereby when C is eliminated by random evidence that leaves A and B alive, the ratio P(A):P(B) ought to drift in the direction of 1:1. (shrink)

►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: [email protected] Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: [email protected] Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (...) ways: ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws’ or ‘Abe knows whether Ben draws or not’. But a stylistic TME occurs in ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws or not’. One can say “Abe knows how Ben looks” using ‘Abe knows what Ben looks like’. But syntactical TMEs are in ‘Abe knows what Ben looks’ and in ‘Abe knows how Ben looks like’. One can deny that Abe knows Ben by prefixing ‘It isn’t that’ or by interpolating ‘doesn’t’. But a pragmatic TME occurs in trying to deny that Abe knows Ben by using ‘It isn’t that Abe doesn’t know Ben’. There are several standard ways of defining truth using sequences. Quine’s discussions in the 1970 first printing of Philosophy of logic [3] and in previous lectures were vitiated by mixing two [1, p. 98]. The logical TME in [3], which eluded Quine’s colleagues, was corrected in the 1978 sixth printing [2]. But Quine never explicitly acknowledged, described, or even mentioned the error. This lecture presents and analyses two-method errors in the logic literature. [1] JOHN CORCORAN, Review of Quine’s 1970 Philosophy of Logic. In Philosophy of Science, vol. 39 (1972), pp. 97–99. [2] JOHN CORCORAN, Review of sixth printing of Quine’s 1970 Philosophy of Logic. In Mathematical Reviews MR0469684 (1979): 57 #9465. [3] WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Philosophy of logic, Harvard, 1970/1986. (shrink)

Kant felsefesine karşı yapılan en yaygın eleştirilerden biri onun öznelci olduğudur. Bu eleştiriyle birlikte ayrıca Berkeleycilik suçlaması ve fenomenalist okuma karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Öznelcilik ithamına göre Kant empirik nesneleri sağlam/zihinden bağımsız bir şekilde düşün(e)mez, bu ise bilincimizin içine sıkışıp kaldığımız bir felsefeye yol açar. Berkeleycilik suçlaması ve fenomenalist okumaya göre de Kant felsefesi sadece görünüşleri bilebileceğimizi söyleyerek, bütün gerçekliği “kafanın-içinde-duran” zihinsel içeriklere indirgemiştir. Bu makalede öncelikle Kant’ın Berkeleycilik ithamına karşı kendi argümanlarını inceleyeceğiz; daha sonra fenomenalist okumanın temel varsayımlarını Van Cleve’in Kant (...) yorumunu mercek altına alarak bulacak ve eleştireceğiz. Bizim görüşümüze göre Van Cleve Kant’ı ele alırken ona iki varsayım isnat eder. Birincisine göre, Kant Kartezyen-Lockeçu temsiliyetçiliği savunur; ikincisine göre, Kantçı özne temelcidir. Bizce bu iki varsayımın Kant’a yüklenmesi haksızdır ve dolayısıyla Berkeleyci fenomenalist okuma ikna edici görünmemektedir. Kant’ın görünüş kavramı “kafanın-içinde-duran” zihinsel içerikler anlamına gelmemektedir; özne ise Kant’ın felsefesinde temelci bir pozisyon işgal etmez, dolayısıyla özne nesneyi salt bir zihinsel içerikmiş gibi taşımaz zira hem özne hem nesne Kant’ta fenomenal alana düşerler. (shrink)

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree”. Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib without qualification.” And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree (...) with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense.” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it. (shrink)

“Meer dan in enige andere periode in de geschiedenis geniet ‘ethiek’ allerwege belangstelling” (p. 7), zo luidt de openingszin van het Handboek gezondheidsethiek (De Beaufort en Dupuis 1988). Discussies in de media lijken deze indruk te bevestigen. Wanneer de interesse van filosofische lezers door dergelijke mediaberichten worden gewekt, kunnen daar tenminste twee redenen voor zijn. Om te beginnen kunnen zij zich geroepen voelen positie te kiezen in het betreffende debat, door voor een bepaald standpunt te opteren en dat met redenen (...) te omkleden. Dat wil zeggen, zij kunnen het als hun opgave beschouwen om, vanuit hun specifieke ethische deskundigheid, de betrokkenen te assisteren door overwegingen naar voren te brengen, aspecten nader te belichten of op tegenspraken te wijzen. Een andere mogelijkheid is dat zij het debat van een wat grotere afstand volgen, door niet de onderhavige problematiek, maar veeleer het debat als zodanig tot voorwerp van onderzoek te maken. Hun interesse, verwondering of irritatie betreft dan niet zozeer de standpunten die door de betrokkenen worden verwoord, maar veeleer het idioom waarin zij hun morele afwegingen articuleren en de vooronderstellingen die ze daarbij hanteren. In deze studie wordt voor de laatste mogelijkheid gekozen. In de gangbare terminologie wordt de eerste mogelijkheid als ‘ethisch’, de tweede mogelijkheid als ‘meta- ethisch’ aangeduid. In de loop van deze studie zal echter naar voren komen dat dit onderscheid inadequaat is. Mijn meta-ethische reflectie op de problematiek van consensusvorming in de gezondheidsethiek, heeft wel degelijk ook een ethische inzet. Deze zal echter eerder ‘fundamenteel-ethisch’ dan ‘toegepast-ethisch’ van karakter zijn. De studie behelst een fundamenteel-ethische doordenking van een problematiek die naar voren komt in een toegepast- ethisch discours: de gezondheidsethiek. (shrink)

I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in[P.McNamara, Nordic J. Philos. Logic 5 (2)(2000) 135] with a framework for obligations. However,the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of a non-agential yet personal obligation operator and a non-deontic (and non-normal) agency operator. This is contrary to the main current trend, which assumes statements of personal obligation always take agential complements. Instead, I take the basic form to be an agent’s being obligated to (...) be such that p. I sketch some logics for agential obligation based on personal obligation and agency, first in a fairly familiar context that rules out conflicting personal obligations (and derivatively, conflicting agential obligations), and then in contexts that do allow for conflicts (of both sorts). (shrink)

Looking at responsibility within a Lévinasian sense, human beings are firstly seen not in the philosophically traditional sense, of being egocentric, but rather seen as ethical subjects based on “the other” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). The purpose of this paper is to examine the notion of responsibility as Lévinas conceptualized in the idea that human beings are responsible for not only themselves but for others. Lévinas within “Ethics as First Philosophy” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989) states that before all other forms (...) of being in the world there must be responsibility to the Other (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). Lévinas defines this to mean that before freedom of the subject, and their subjectivity, before self-consciousness, before the consciousness of consciousness, before being, and before relativity there is “responsibility for the Other pre-exists any self-consciousness” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75). Perhaps, Lévinas is saying that a human beings obligation comes before all of what follows from our being in this world, our obligation to the Other beginning with the “face to face” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75), interaction, which is our first and foremost responsibility, the responsibility to the Other. And to be ethical beings who begin with responsibility we rely on the fundamental relationship of others. This notion of responsibility appears when we encounter, in the face-to-face interaction, the unknowable other. However, does this responsibility extend to more than two individuals and to those outside our immediate proximity? For example, Lévinas states that it is the “face to face” notion of seeing one in distress, yet what if it is a group of people, and what if they are not in close proximity but on the other side of the world? What if they are on the other side of a screen that can also be artificial intelligence in our modern era. Are we still responsible? And if we are responsible, how does Lévinas’s concept of responsibility fit into that situation or is it limited? I want to examine responsibility in terms of proximity through a Lévinasian ethical lens and plurality, defined as more than two individuals, by questioning responsibility in terms of relationality, and vulnerability. I will be looking mainly at five authors Emmanuel Lévinas, Ernst Van Alphen, Judith Butler, Kevin Quashi, and Lisa Guenther, to answer the question of whether Lévinas’s definition of responsibility includes proximity, and plurality. (shrink)

Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to (...) the environment. A “direct” relation is one where the boundaries between the body and the head, or between the environment and the animal are not theoretically important in the understanding of cognition. These boundaries do not play a theoretically privileged role in cognitive explanations of behavior. But representationalism appears to put a representational veil between the locus of cognition and that which is represented, making cognitive relations to the body and to the environment be indirect, with a high associated computational load. For this reason, direct approaches have tried to minimize the use of internal representations (Suchman 1987; Barwise 1987; Agre and Chapman 1987; Brooks 1992; Thelen and Smith 1994; van Gelder 1995; Port and van Gelder 1995; Clark 1997, 1999; Rupert 2009, p. 180). Does a cognitive neuroscience committed to direct relations rule out a representationalist approach to body knowledge? Or is direct representationalism possible? (shrink)

The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 … Pn and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ∼P1 … ∼Pn, respectively. However, the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of peer disagreement (...) about P. After some terminology is defined (§1), Peter van Inwagen's challenge to the steadfast view will be presented (§2). The preface paradox will then be presented and diagnosed (§3), and it will be argued that van Inwagen's challenge relies on the same principle that generates the preface paradox (§4). The reasonable response to multi-peer disagreement will be discussed (§5), and an objection addressed (§6). (shrink)

Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is (...) paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively. (shrink)